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Abstract 
A rich tradition in self-control research has documented the negative consequences of 
exerting self-control in one task for self-control performance in subsequent tasks. However, 
there is a dearth of research examining what happens when people exert self-control in 
multiple domains simultaneously. The current research aims to fill this gap. We integrate 
predictions from the most prominent models of self-control with recent neuropsychological 
insights in the human inhibition system to generate the novel hypothesis that exerting 
effortful self-control in one task can simultaneously improve self-control in completely 
unrelated domains. An internal meta-analysis on all 18 studies we conducted shows that 
exerting self-control in one domain (i.e., controlling attention, food consumption, emotions or 
thoughts) simultaneously improves self-control in a range of other domains, as demonstrated 
by, for example, reduced unhealthy food consumption, better Stroop task performance, and 
less impulsive decision making. A subset of nine studies demonstrates the crucial nature of 
task timing – when the same tasks are executed sequentially, our results suggest the 
emergence of an ego depletion effect. We provide conservative estimates of the self-control 
facilitation (d = |0.22|) as well as the ego depletion effect size (d = |0.17|) free of data 
selection and publication biases. These results (i) shed new light on self-control theories, (ii) 
confirm recent claims that previous estimates of the ego depletion effect size were inflated 
due to publication bias, and (iii) provide a blueprint for how to handle the power issues and 
associated file drawer problems commonly encountered in multi-study research projects.  
 
Keywords: self-control, multi-tasking, inhibitory spillover, ego depletion, internal meta-
analysis, inhibition   
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The Propagation of Self-Control:  
Self-Control in One Domain Simultaneously Improves Self-Control in Other Domains 
 
The human ability to exert self-control is a crucial determinant of adaptive 
functioning such as adherence to morals, laws, social norms and other rules and regulations. 
Successful self-control lies at the heart of mental and physical health, popularity, and 
professional and interpersonal success, whereas a lack of self-control increases susceptibility 
to undesirable behaviors such as eating disorders and drugs and alcohol abuse (Gailliot, 
Baumeister, et al., 2007; Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004). Self-control refers to 
people’s ability to alter their behavioral tendencies to bring them in line with their long-term 
goals or standards. Due to its vast impact on a wide variety of human behaviors, self-control 
is studied in multiple subfields of psychology. For example, neuropsychologists aim to gain a 
deeper understanding of the neural correlates of self-control exertion (J. D. Cohen, Botvinick, 
& Carter, 2000; J. R. Cohen & Lieberman, 2010); health and clinical psychologists are 
interested in how people cope with negative emotions and try to resist the lure of unhealthy 
foods and other substances (Davis, Patte, Curtis, & Reid, 2010); social psychologists study 
how self-control shapes the dynamics of interpersonal interactions (Gailliot, Plant, Butz, & 
Baumeister, 2007; Johns, Inzlicht, & Schmader, 2008), and cognitive psychologists 
investigate how self-control influences working memory span or response inhibition 
(Schmeichel, 2007).  
A prominent field of research has focused on understanding the dynamic nature of 
self-control performance. Over 100 studies in various subfields of psychology, neuroscience, 
behavioral economics and consumer behavior have demonstrated that exerting self-control at 
time 1 leads to reduced self-control at time 2 (for a review and meta-analysis see Hagger, 
Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010; Inzlicht, Schmeichel, & Macrae, 2014). This research 
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stream is largely informed by the ‘limited resource model’ (aka the ‘strength model’) of self-
control (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007), 
which argues that all acts of self-control draw from a common and limited pool of mental 
energy. Depleting this resource by exerting self-control in one task will result in a temporary 
decline in self-control in other tasks – an effect commonly referred to as ego depletion. 
Despite its intuitive appeal, however, the lack of evidence for a limited resource as the 
underlying process led Inzlicht and colleagues to propose an alternative, non-resource-based 
‘process model of self-control depletion’ (Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012; Inzlicht et al., 2014), 
which assigns a central role to a shift in people’s motivation between task priorities.  
Irrespective of the debate about the underlying psychological process, this stream of 
research has unquestionably deepened our understanding of sequential self-control dynamics. 
However, the question of how people cope with simultaneous self-control conflicts has 
received limited research attention. This is unfortunate for two major reasons. First, multi-
tasking is of central importance in contemporary society. An ever increasing number of 
temptations present multiple challenges to people’s self-control simultaneously. For example, 
self-control in the social domain (e.g., controlling one’s emotions during a movie) can 
coincide with self-control in food consumption (e.g., resisting popcorn), just as attention 
control (e.g., avoiding distracting banner ads while browsing the internet) can coincide with 
self-control in decision making (e.g., resisting impulsive online purchases). Yet insights on 
the consequences of exerting self-control simultaneously in different domains are glaringly 
absent from the literature.  
Second, investigating what happens when people exert self-control in multiple 
domains simultaneously may shed light on the psychological processes underlying self-
control. Both the limited resource model and the process model focus primarily on explaining 
sequential self-control dynamics. While assuming different underlying processes, essentially 
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both models predict that self-control will diminish at time 2 after being exerted at time 1. 
However, as we will outline below, extending the models to situations where people exert 
self-control in multiple domains simultaneously (both at time 1) allows diverging predictions 
to emerge.  
Theoretical Framework 
Self-control is defined as the human ability to inhibit automatic, habitual, or innate 
behaviors, urges, emotions or desires that would otherwise interfere with goal-directed 
behavior (Muraven, Shmueli, & Burkley, 2006). While people can employ various self-
control strategies (e.g., avoiding temptation altogether, Fujita, 2011), when temptation is 
encountered, self-control reflects a struggle between impulses and desires on the one hand 
and inhibitory forces on the other hand (Hofmann & Van Dillen, 2012). Inhibitory control 
helps people to restrain impulsive response tendencies and allows for other responses in line 
with their long-term goals (Diamond, 2013; Hofmann, Schmeichel, & Baddeley, 2012; 
Inzlicht et al., 2014; Schmeichel, 2007).  
In the last decade, research on self-control and self-control dynamics has been 
strongly influenced by the limited resource model (or strength model) of self-control 
(Baumeister et al., 1998; Baumeister et al., 2007; Muraven et al., 2006), which posits that all 
effortful, non-habitual acts of self-control draw from a common but limited energy resource. 
Note that only effortful acts of self-control are assumed to deplete the limited resource, while 
effortless acts of self-control (e.g., physiological forms of control such as regulating body 
temperature or heart rate variability) should operate independent of the limited resource 
(Baumeister et al., 2007). Depletion of the resource by an initial act of self-control will result 
in performance deterioration when subsequent self-control challenges are encountered. 
Indeed evidence abounds that exerting self-control in a wide variety of tasks, ranging from 
emotion control, thought control, and attention control to food consumption control, has 
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detrimental consequences for subsequent self-control in an equally wide range of domains 
(Hagger et al., 2010).  
Although empirical work has focused on sequential task settings, the predictions of 
the limited resource model for simultaneous acts of self-control are relatively straightforward. 
That is, if engaging in effortful, non-habitual self-control tasks uses up limited resources, then 
we would expect a deterioration of self-control ability in unrelated domains irrespective of 
whether the self-control challenges are faced simultaneously or in sequence. In support of this 
notion, Muraven and Baumeister (2000) argued that “like other limited resource models (such 
as attention), the strength model predicts that simultaneous attempts at self-control […] may 
lead to poorer self-control overall” (p.249, italics added; see also Kaplan & Berman, 2010 for 
similar predictions).  
If, as some researchers have argued, it takes time for the limited pool of self-
regulatory resources to become depleted (Vohs & Faber, 2007), then simultaneous efforts of 
self-control may suffer less from the resource limitation than those sequentially encountered. 
But either way, a limited resource model would never predict an increase in self-control 
ability for simultaneously encountered self-control challenges.   
While evidence for the detrimental effect on sequential tasks has accumulated over 
the last decade, empirical support for the limited resource view as the underlying process is 
scarce and is treated with increasing skepticism (see Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012; Inzlicht et 
al., 2014 for a review of the major critiques of the strength model). Inzlicht and colleagues 
proposed a more mechanistic process model to explain ego depletion effects. According to 
this process model, the refractory period of self-control is the consequence of an evolutionary 
process that allows organisms to balance their desires for exploitation and exploration, which 
translates into a tendency to seek a balance between externally rewarded labor and inherently 
rewarding leisure. They argue that, at time 1, people experience a motivation for ‘have-to’ 
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tasks and exert self-control, after which they experience a temporary reduction in ‘have-to’ 
motivation at time 2 and an increased motivation for ‘want-to’ tasks which are personally 
enjoyable and meaningful. This shift in motivation allows them to engage both in exploiting 
established sources of reward and exploring the environment for new opportunities of reward. 
It prevents them from becoming preoccupied with one source of reward and allows for the 
sampling of other opportunities. According to the process model, it is this shift in motivation, 
attention, and emotion away from ‘have-to’ tasks towards ‘want-to’ tasks that makes people 
more likely to give into temptation at time 2, which lies at the heart of the ego-depletion 
effect.  
The process model (Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012; Inzlicht et al., 2014) has focused on 
explaining the ego-depletion effect in sequential task settings, and the question is what the 
model would predict for simultaneous acts of self-control. To answer this question, we need 
to consider more precisely what happens when people engage in a ‘have-to’ task requiring 
self-control. Whereas self-control conflicts are often conceptualized as a choice between an 
impulsive option (e.g., a chocolate cake) and a controlled option (e.g., an apple), engaging in 
a ‘have-to’ task will often require the inhibition of not one but several different impulses. 
Consider, for example, what happens when one engages in a ‘have-to’ task at work, such as 
writing a report. This requires continuous control of attention (e.g., not being distracted by 
favorite websites, colleagues down the hall or incoming emails), as well as of emotions (e.g., 
frustration with an unproductive colleague) and of thoughts (e.g., about the upcoming 
weekend or ruminating over an argument with your partner earlier). Hence succeeding at 
‘have-to’ tasks will require the inhibition of not just one, but many different impulses that 
could interfere with task performance. While captured in the definition of self-control (as the 
human ability to inhibit automatic, habitual, or innate behaviors, urges, emotions or desires 
that would otherwise interfere with goal directed behavior; Muraven et al., 2006), the fact 
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that successful self-control often requires control over all of these impulses at the same time 
has been insufficiently considered in the literature. The crucial question is: Are humans 
equipped with the ability to inhibit multiple impulses at the same time? 
Recent insights into the neuropsychological underpinnings of self-control suggest that 
this might indeed be the case. As noted earlier, response inhibition lies at the core of 
successful self-control (Diamond, 2013; Hofmann et al., 2012; Inzlicht et al., 2014). It has 
been proposed that inhibition of responses in a wide variety of domains originates from a 
single neural network. While various forms of response inhibition may seem vastly different 
(e.g., inhibiting affective, cognitive or motor impulses), they all depend on a few tightly-
linked neurological areas, including the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, the lateral prefrontal 
cortex and the anterior cingulate cortex; together known as the “inhibitory network” (Aron, 
Robbins, & Poldrack, 2004; Berkman, Burklund, & Lieberman, 2009; J. R. Cohen & 
Lieberman, 2010; Heatherton, 2011; Heatherton & Wagner, 2011; Tabibnia et al., 2011).  
Importantly, Berkman and colleagues (2009) proposed that if inhibitory signals for 
such a wide variety of tasks originate in the same areas of the brain, it is possible that 
inhibitory signals are not completely domain specific. Rather, recruiting the inhibitory 
network to intentionally inhibit one response may simultaneously facilitate response 
inhibition in unrelated domains, a phenomenon referred to as “inhibitory spillover.” Initial 
support for inhibitory spillover at the neurological level was provided by Berkman and 
colleagues who found that the intentional inhibition of a motor response (in a go/no-go task) 
resulted in the unintentional inhibition of simultaneously occurring emotional responses in 
the amygdala, an effect mediated by the activation of the inhibitory network in the right 
prefrontal cortex.  
Further support for this theory was provided by Tuk, Trampe and Warlop (2011), who 
examined the impact of a visceral state on behavioral inhibition. They argued that increasing 
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levels of bladder pressure require stronger inhibition signals to prevent a voiding impulse, 
which – according to the inhibitory spillover hypothesis – should increase response inhibition 
in unrelated domains. These authors found that higher levels of urination urgency correlated 
positively with performance on the Stroop task and increased intertemporal patience in a 
delay discounting task.  
Whether or not inhibitory spillover plays a significant role in the effortful self-control 
tasks studied in the 100-plus articles that followed Baumeister et al’s (1998) seminal article 
is, however, not a priori clear. As indicated, evidence for inhibitory spillover is limited to the 
neurological level (Berkman et al., 2009) or collected in the context of a highly learned and 
automatized visceral state (Tuk et al., 2011). These preliminary findings are susceptible to 
alternative explanations, such as devaluation effects or embodied willpower (Brendl, 
Markman, & Messner, 2003; Hung & Labroo, 2011) and cannot ex ante be generalized to the 
effortful, non-habitual self-control tasks considered in the self-control literature. As outlined 
above, it is exactly for these effortful self-control tasks that the limited resource model would 
predict a decline in performance on a second task irrespective of task timing.  
Conversely, reasoning based on the process model and inhibitory spillover would 
suggest a rather different outcome when multiple self-control tasks are faced simultaneously.  
According to the inhibitory spillover hypothesis, when people engage in a ‘have-to’ task and 
inhibit a focal impulse, this should facilitate the inhibition of other impulses as well. Hence, 
self-control in unrelated domains will benefit and people become less impulsive. Therefore, 
the primary aim of the current research is to examine whether exerting intentional, effortful 
self-control in one domain facilitates simultaneous self-control performance in unrelated 
domains.  
Berkman and colleagues (2009) found that inhibitory spillover effects at the 
neurological level were limited to the time window in which control was exerted in a primary 
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task. Specifically, their results showed that amygdala activation was only suppressed during 
those trials in a go/no-go task where a motor response had to be inhibited, but not during 
intermediate trials. Hence if the self-control facilitation effect we expect to observe is the 
consequence of a spillover of inhibitory signals, then it should be limited to the time window 
in which control is exerted on the primary task. We thus hypothesize that the timing of the 
self-control tasks (simultaneous vs. sequential) constitutes a crucial moderator of whether the 
inhibitory spillover versus the ego-depletion effect will be observed.  
We will examine the impact of exerting self-control in one domain on simultaneous 
versus sequential self-control performance in an unrelated domain in a subset of studies. By 
showing both an inhibitory spillover effect (for simultaneous self-control tasks) and an ego 
depletion effect (for sequential self-control tasks), we aim to provide converging evidence for 
the crucial role played by task timing. Finding both effects with the exact same tasks would 
also rule out alternative explanations for a self-control facilitation effect caused by specific 
task characteristics such as an increase in cognitive control as a consequence of response 
conflict similarity (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Dang, Dewitte, Mao, 
Xiao, & Shi, 2013; Dewitte, Bruyneel, & Geyskens, 2009). Finally, while it is not our 
primary aim here, testing the emergence of the ego depletion effect under sequential task 
settings with a variety of different paradigms also answers recent calls for more replication 
studies of the ego depletion effect in order to provide more accurate estimates of its effect 
size and confidence interval (Carter & McCullough, 2013; Hagger & Chatzisarantis, 2014).  
Study Approach 
To provide evidence for our proposition that exerting self-control in one domain 
simultaneously facilitates self-control in other unrelated domains, we borrow our general 
experimental approach from the ego depletion literature. Specifically, we opted for a multi-
study approach using a wide variety of the most well-known independent variables (IVs) and 
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dependent variables (DVs) from the ego-depletion literature (e.g., attention control, emotion 
control, control of unhealthy food consumption, impulsive decision making and Stroop task 
performance; see Hagger et al. (2010) Appendix A for numerous references to these tasks in 
the ego depletion literature). Where our research departs from previous work is that we 
administered these tasks simultaneously rather than sequentially. To demonstrate the 
existence of a domain-unspecific inhibitory spillover effect, finding convergence across a 
variety of paradigms was considered more informative than any single experiment could be. 
A recurring problem with the multi-study approach is that individual studies fail to 
reach the conventional significance threshold level of p < .05. A strong reliance on null-
hypothesis testing results in a dichotomous decision for each individual study as “succeeded” 
(p < .05; the study is reported, potentially after having applied researchers’ degrees of 
freedom in data collection and analysis; Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011) or “failed” 
(p > .05; the study often ends up in a file drawer; Ferguson & Heene, 2012; John, 
Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2012; Rosenthal, 1979; Spellman, 2012). One of the consequences of 
this ‘publication bias’ is an inflation of effect size estimates, resulting in uncertainty with 
regard to whether a published phenomenon can be considered a “real” effect at all 
(Schimmack, 2012; Simonsohn, Nelson, & Simmons, 2014). For example, some authors have 
argued that the effect size of the ego depletion effect (estimated at Cohen’s d = 0.62 based on 
a meta-analysis of all published ego depletion studies by Hagger et al., 2010) has been 
seriously inflated, potentially as a consequence of publication bias. Carter and McCullough 
(2013, 2014) estimate its true effect size at a maximum of d = 0.25, depending on the method 
used to correct for publication bias (see Hagger & Chatzisarantis, 2014, for a response to this 
analysis). This problem is not confined to the self-control literature (Bakker, van Dijk, & 
Wicherts, 2012).The reliance on null-hypothesis testing for evaluating individual studies has 
also been criticized based on the enormous variation in p-values, even between exact 
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replications (Cumming, 2014). In fact, the chance of finding a significant difference in a two-
cell design with 25 participants per cell and an effect size of d  = 0.30 is only 18% (Braver et 
al., 2014).
1
 One’s chances of obtaining significance in both the original study and an exact 
replication are then as low as 3%.  
The literature suggests a range of approaches to overcome this pitfall. Beyond 
traditional approaches such as removing (statistical) outliers in individual studies or 
significantly increasing sample size
2
, it has recently been suggested that internal meta-
analysis constitutes a sound approach to overcome power problems common to the multi-
study approach (Braver, Thoemmes, & Rosenthal, 2014; Cumming, 2014; Maner, 2014; 
Schimmack, 2012; Stanley & Spence, 2014). The crucial insight offered by these authors is 
that even though individual studies might fail to reach the p < .05 criterion, they could 
nevertheless provide more (rather than less) evidence for the existence of an effect. By 
pooling data of various studies (with homogeneous effect sizes) the power level of the 
significance test increases and the confidence interval of the effect size estimate narrows. As 
a consequence, pooling the data of a series of replications ultimately results in a high 
probability of finding significance if an effect exists, while the chances of accurately 
identifying a null effect also improve (Braver et al., 2014). In other words, both Type I and 
Type II error chances are reduced. The key idea is that, rather than providing conclusive 
evidence for the (non)existence of an effect, an individual study should be seen as an estimate 
of reality. A meta-analysis containing all these individual study estimates can provide more 
conclusive insights on the size of an effect, as well as the precision with which it is measured 
(i.e., the confidence interval).  
Based on the above-mentioned considerations as well as our primary theoretical 
interest in the consequences of simultaneous self-control exertion in general, we present an 
internal meta-analysis of all 18 studies conducted for this research project. It should be noted 
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that rather than using meta-analysis as a tool to provide a synthesis of the literature, we use 
meta-analysis as our primary method of analysis to examine the existence and size of the 
inhibitory spillover effect. The structure of the meta-analysis section is as follows: We start 
with a general description of our samples, details of our data collection procedures, 
manipulations, and dependent measures. After providing an overview of the experimental 
designs, we discuss the consequences of simultaneous self-control exertion, followed by a 
discussion of sequential self-control exertion. Then we test whether task timing serves the 
proposed moderating role. We will also discuss various indices of publication bias.  
Method: Internal Meta-Analysis of 18 Studies 
Overview and Participants  
We tested the inhibitory spillover effect in a series of k = 18 different studies, with 
1695 participants in total. Two participants failed to follow crucial research instructions and 
we were unable to collect their data (the RA could not provide them with food in studies 
where food consumption was the crucial dependent variable). One participant was allergic to 
chips in a study where consumption of chips was the crucial dependent variable. This left 
1692 valid observations, 1015 females and 677 males (age M = 28.4, SD = 10.3). Of these 18 
studies, eight studies were conducted in the labs of three universities (n = 703) and 10 were 
conducted online (using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk; n = 989). Participants in lab studies 
were primarily European, while participants in the online studies were mainly from the US 
(see Supplemental Online Material for study-specific details). The lab studies that required 
specific interactions with the participant (e.g., providing and removing food in studies that 
manipulated or measured food consumption control) were conducted by various RAs who 
were blind to our hypotheses and/or condition allocation. While there was no difference 
between online studies and lab studies in terms of gender composition (60.5% women in lab 
studies and 59.7% women in online studies, χ2 = 0.74, p = .74), participants in the lab studies 
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were slightly younger and more homogeneous in terms of age (Mlab = 22.24, SDlab = 3.09 
versus Monline = 32.77, SDonline = 11.35, t(1186.7) = 27.76, p < .001, Satterthwaite correction 
for inequality in variance).  
Independent Variables  
As we aimed to examine the consequence of exerting self-control in a wide variety of 
domains on simultaneous self-control ability in unrelated domains, we manipulated self-
control exertion in five different domains – thought control (TC), attention control (AC), 
cognitive impulse control (CIC), consumption control (CC) and emotion control (EC). We 
aimed to measure self-control ability in an unrelated domain while participants were engaging 
in these various self-control tasks. We provide a general description of each manipulation 
below. Study-specific details can be found in the Supplemental Online Material.  
Attention control. In five studies, we manipulated whether participants had to control 
their attention from being directed to distracting objects. Prior research suggests that focusing 
attention requires active inhibition of the impulse to attend to distracting stimuli (Diamond, 
2013; Rueda, Posner, & Rothbart, 2011). This inhibition of attention shifts is known to result 
in a loss of self-control in sequential paradigms (see Hagger et al., 2010 for a reference to 24 
studies showing depletion effects after various forms of attention control). Specifically, in 
three studies (Studies 4, 16, 17) participants in the attention-control condition were asked to 
focus attention on a woman instead of on words displayed at the bottom of the screen while 
watching a video (Gailliot, Baumeister, et al., 2007; Gilbert, Krull, & Pelham, 1988). 
Participants in the matched control condition did not receive such instructions and watched 
the video freely. Instead of measuring self-control ability after participants finished watching 
the video (as in previous research on ego depletion), we offered them various unhealthy foods 
(e.g., Pringles chips or M&M’s) for consumption while they were watching this video and 
controlling their attention.  
THE PROPAGATION OF SELF-CONTROL                                        16 
 
In two studies (Studies 6 and 9) we manipulated attention control in an online setting. 
Participants were exposed to a banner ad on the top of their screen which consisted of five 
different ads, displayed for two seconds before automatically switching to the next ad. This 
nonstop change was implemented to ensure that attention was constantly drawn to this 
distractor and avoiding looking at the banner ads would continuously require effortful control 
of attention (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). Participants in the attention-control condition were 
instructed to avoid looking at the banner ads by all means whereas participants in the control 
condition did not receive such instructions.
3
 Simultaneous self-control ability was measured 
with brief self-control scenarios that were displayed on the same webpage.  
Thought control. In nine studies we manipulated whether participants had to 
suppress unwanted thoughts (Wegner & Gold, 1995; Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 
1987; see Hagger et al., 2010 for references to 26 studies using thought suppression in the 
ego depletion literature). Thought control requires continuous inhibition of the “forbidden” 
thoughts (Diamond, 2013) and is known to result in a decline in self-control performance on 
tasks administered after the thought-control task. Participants in the thought-control present 
condition were asked not to think about a forbidden object (e.g., a white bear) during a 2-3 
minute thought-listing task and to press a (bogus) button if they inadvertently happened to 
think about the forbidden object. Contrary to previous research on ego depletion, task 
simultaneity was imposed by instructing participants after the thought-listing task to continue 
not to think of the forbidden object while proceeding with the next task, which was a measure 
of self-control ability in an unrelated domain (e.g., delay of gratification or impulse control in 
a self-control scenario – see the “Dependent Variables” section for further details). The 
button that participants had to press if they inadvertently thought of the forbidden object 
remained present during this second task for participants in the thought-control present 
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condition. Participants in the matched control conditions completed the same tasks but did 
not receive the thought-suppression instructions.  
Cognitive impulse control. In one study (Study 12), we manipulated cognitive 
impulse control with the “crossing-out-letters task” (see Hagger et al., 2010 for a reference to 
20 studies using this paradigm in the ego depletion literature). Participants in the cognitive 
impulse control condition were instructed to cross out all “e’s” unless there was another 
vowel immediately adjacent to it or one letter away from it. Participants in the matched 
control condition were instructed to simply cross out all “e’s” in a text. Participants were 
additionally instructed to indicate their preferences whenever they came across a choice in 
the target text. These were delay discounting questions. Hence, participants both had to cross 
the “e’s” in the question framing, and select the option of their preference at the same time. 
 In Study 7, cognitive impulse control was manipulated by means of an essay writing 
task (Muraven, Gagne, & Rosman, 2008; Muraven et al., 2006). Participants in the cognitive 
impulse control condition were instructed to avoid using the letters "à" and "â" while writing 
an essay in French (their native language), whereas participants in the matched control 
condition did not receive such instructions. Simultaneous self-control ability was assessed by 
measuring participants’ Pringles chips consumption while they were writing their essay. 
 Consumption control. In one study (Study 5), controlling consumption of unhealthy 
foods served as our independent variable. Participants started with a taste test and were 
provided with a bowl filled with Pringles chips. They were asked to take one chip, savor it 
and evaluate it. Then they continued with the next task (the Stroop task; Stroop, 1935). 
Participants in the consumption control condition were additionally instructed to avoid eating 
any more of the chips, while participants in the control condition were free to continue 
consuming chips if they wished. Performance on the Stroop task served as our measure of 
simultaneous self-control ability.  
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Emotion control. In one study (Study 15), we used another well-known paradigm 
from the ego depletion literature – the emotion-control paradigm (used in 23 studies testing 
the ego depletion effect; Hagger et al., 2010). Participants watched a 7-minute episode from 
the movie “City of God.” The episode contained both positive (a party with people 
celebrating) and negative (a fierce argument and a shooting) emotional aspects. Participants 
in the emotion-control condition were instructed not to feel or display any emotional reaction 
while watching this video clip, whereas participants in the matched control condition did not 
receive such instructions. Simultaneous self-control was assessed by serving tempting but 
unhealthy foods (Pringles) while participants were watching this episode.  
Dependent Variables  
We measured the impact of exerting self-control in one domain on simultaneous self-
control ability in the following domains: Choice and volition (CV), unhealthy food 
consumption (UFC), unhealthy food consumption intentions (UFI), and cognitive impulse 
control (CIC). An overview of these categories of dependent variables and measurement 
scales is given below; details can be found in the Supplemental Online Material. For the 
meta-analysis all dependent variables were z-transformed in order to form a standardized 
index of impulse control.  
Choice and volition. In 10 studies, self-control ability was measured in the broad 
domain of choice and volition. In two studies (Studies 1 and 12) self-control ability was 
assessed with a delay discounting task in which participants could choose between receiving 
a smaller amount of money (e.g., $67) tomorrow or receiving a larger amount of money (e.g., 
$85) later in time (e.g., 70 days from now; Li, 2008; Tuk et al., 2011). Our measure of 
impulse control is the number of times participants chose the delayed reward (ranging from 0 
= always the immediate reward, to 8 = always the delayed reward). In general, people who 
prefer smaller amounts of a reward immediately are thought to be impulsive or to lack self-
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control, because they cannot control or inhibit their desire for an immediate payoff even 
though it would be beneficial in the long term to do so (J. R. Cohen & Lieberman, 2010).  
In the other eight studies (Studies 2, 3, 6, 9-11, 13,14), we presented participants with 
various self-control scenarios, always depicting similar trade-offs between immediately 
gratifying options (e.g., going out with a friend; buying a nice pair of shoes on sale) and 
options that would be beneficial in the long term (e.g., studying for an important exam; 
saving a target amount of money; scenarios adapted from Hung & Labroo, 2011; Labroo & 
Patrick, 2009; Rook & Fisher, 1995). Self-control was typically assessed by asking 
participants what they would do in this situation (measured on 7- or 9-point scales where one 
extreme would reflect “definitely going for [the immediately rewarding option]” and the 
other extreme would reflect “definitely going for [the long-term beneficial option]”).  
Unhealthy food consumption. In five studies (Studies 4, 7, 15, 16, 17), our key 
measure of impulse control was the consumption of unhealthy food, a well-known measure of 
self-control ability in the ego depletion literature (see Hagger et al., 2010 Appendix A for a 
reference to 11 studies). Controlling the consumption of unhealthy foods requires the 
inhibition of the temptation to eat high-calorie, high-fat food (Inzlicht & Kang, 2010; Vohs & 
Heatherton, 2000). In four studies, participants were provided with a bowl filled with 20 
Pringles chips. The number of chips eaten is considered a measure of impulsivity; hence the 
number of chips left over serves as our key measure of impulse control. In one study we 
provided participants with a bowl filled with 180 grams of M&M’s and weighed the amount 
left over. In all studies the participant had to notify the RA (blind to our hypotheses and/or 
condition allocation) to start the primary self-control task (e.g., for starting the attention 
control movie or the emotion control movie). The RA then also provided them with the 
foods, told them that these were left-overs from another study, and that they could consume 
as much as they wanted. The participants had to notify the RA once they finished the primary 
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self-control task, which allowed the RA to remove the foods when the participants stopped 
exerting self-control.    
Unhealthy food consumption intentions. In Study 18 we measured consumption 
intentions towards unhealthy foods; in Study 8 we measured consumption intentions towards 
both healthy and unhealthy foods. Consumption intentions for healthy versus unhealthy foods 
serve as our measure of impulse control in the meta-analysis (Cornil & Chandon, 2013; 
Hedgcock, Vohs, & Rao, 2012). Impulsive intentions have frequently been used as a proxy of 
impulsive behavior and Hagger and colleagues’ (2010) meta-analysis indicated no difference 
in effect size between behavioral and non-behavioral measures of the depletion effect.  
Cognitive impulse control. In Study 5 we examined the influence of exerting self-
control in one domain on impulse control in an unrelated domain with a classic measure of 
inhibitory control – the Stroop task (Hofmann et al., 2012; Stroop, 1935). In the Stroop task, 
participants are presented with a series of color words printed in various colors (e.g., the word 
“red” printed in blue). The task instructions alternately ask the participant to name the word 
itself or the color it is printed in. A response conflict only emerges when there is a mismatch 
between the word name and its color (the incongruent trials) and the incorrect response needs 
to be inhibited in order to state the correct response. Performance on this task is known to be 
subject to ego depletion effects in sequential settings. In line with previous work, response 
accuracy on the incongruent trials serves as our key measure of impulse control in the meta-
analysis (Gailliot, Baumeister, et al., 2007; Gailliot, Schmeichel, & Baumeister, 2006; Job, 
Dweck, & Walton, 2010; see the Supplemental Online Material for further details).  
Moderator: Simultaneous versus Sequential Self-Control  
In the first set of nine studies, we only examined the consequences of exerting self-
control in one domain on simultaneous self-control ability in unrelated domains. In the 
second set of nine studies (Studies 10-18) we also tested whether the ego-depletion effect 
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would emerge if the same tasks were administered in sequence. It should be noted that our 
key comparisons always center around the differential impact of exerting self-control versus 
not exerting self-control in a focal task on self-control ability in an unrelated domain. Hence 
we never directly compare a condition where people exerted self-control simultaneously with 
a condition where people exerted self-control sequentially, as a difference between these two 
groups can be fully driven by an ego-depletion effect in the sequential task paradigms, an 
inhibitory spillover effect in the simultaneous paradigms, or a combination of both (as we 
expect). Only by comparing the impact of exerting self-control with not exerting self-control 
on simultaneous or on sequential self-control ability in an unrelated domain can we draw 
unequivocal conclusions about the emergence of an inhibitory spillover or an ego-depletion 
effect. This underlines the need to have control conditions that match as closely as possible to 
the various self-control conditions. Therefore, for each experiment that was intended to test 
the moderating impact of task timing, we carefully considered whether the specific 
experimental design allowed for one control condition (Studies 10-14), or whether two 
different control conditions (one matching with the simultaneous self-control condition and 
one matching with the sequential self-control condition) were required (Studies 15-18).  
For example, the “white bear” paradigm and its variants allowed for one control 
condition, resulting in three conditions in total. In studies with this design, all participants 
were asked to engage in a thought listing task of 2-3 minutes. Additionally, two thirds of the 
participants (those in the simultaneous and sequential self-control conditions) were instructed 
to suppress all thoughts of white bears during the thought-listing ask, while participants in the 
matched control condition did not receive the thought-suppression instructions. The thought-
listing task was followed by a measure of impulse control (e.g., a delay discounting task). 
Participants in the simultaneous self-control condition were additionally instructed to 
continue not to think of a white bear, while participants in the sequential self-control 
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condition were told that they were free to think of anything from now on. Hence, for 
participants in the simultaneous self-control condition, the thought-suppression task 
continued while we assessed their impulse control in an unrelated domain. For participants in 
the sequential self-control condition, the thought-suppression task ended before their impulse 
control in an unrelated domain was assessed.  
In Studies 15-18 we used two separate matched control conditions. As a consequence 
these studies had a 2 (self-control: present vs. absent) x 2 (task timing: simultaneous vs. 
sequential) design. For example, in Study 15 we used the emotion control paradigm. All 
participants saw a 7-minute video clip form the movie “City of God”. Participants in the self-
control present conditions were instructed not to feel or display any emotions during this 
video, whereas those in the self-control absent conditions could watch the video freely. 
Additionally, half of the participants (in the simultaneous condition) received a bowl filled 
with Pringles chips together with this movie clip. The difference in Pringles consumption in 
this simultaneous condition between participants in the self-control present and the self-
control absent conditions served as our measure of the inhibitory spillover effect. While the 
participants in the sequential conditions received similar emotion control instructions during 
the first clip, they did not receive a bowl of Pringles yet. Rather, they proceeded with a 
second video clip – a 7-minute video from the movie Slumdog Millionaire, resembling the 
previous clip in that it also contained both positive (people partying) and negative (a shooting 
scene) emotional aspects. Participants in the self-control present condition (who had 
controlled their emotions during the first clip) were told that they were free to experience and 
display emotions during the second clip. All participants in the sequential conditions were 
provided with a bowl of Pringles chips while watching this second video clip. The difference 
in Pringles consumption between participants who previously had controlled their emotions 
(in the self-control present – sequential condition) versus those who had not controlled their 
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emotions (in the self-control absent – sequential condition) served as our key measure of the 
ego-depletion effect. Similar experimental designs were used with the attention-control video 
(Studies 16 and 17) and with the “old flames” paradigm (Study 18).    
As a result, in the meta-analysis, participants in the control condition of the five 3-cell 
studies (studies 10-14, n = 156) feature both in the test of the inhibitory spillover effect and in 
the test of the ego-depletion effect, while Studies 15-18 had two different control conditions. 
Hence, we test the inhibitory spillover effect in simultaneous self-control conditions, where 
we had 624 participants in self-control conditions and 644 participants in matched control 
conditions. We test the ego-depletion effect in sequential self-control conditions, where we 
had 281 participants in self-control conditions and 299 participants in matched control 
conditions.   
Additional Measures  
 In addition to our primary research aim to examine the consequences of simultaneous 
self-control exertion, we also measured a number of personality measures at the end of 
various studies. Since it has been suggested that there are interpersonal differences in human 
ability to inhibit responses and engage in inhibitory control, we considered it relevant to 
include measures that tap into these personality traits. Specifically, we measured sensitivity 
of the Behavioral Inhibition System and Behavioral Activation System with the BIS/BAS 
questionnaire or the Sensitivity to Punishment and Sensitivity to Reward Questionnaire 
(SPSRQ; Carver & White, 1994; Gray & McNaughton, 2000; Nigg, 2000; Torrubia, Avila, 
Molto, & Caseras, 2001). We measured individual differences in executive inhibition with 
the Effortful Control scale (Rothbart, Ahadi, & Evans, 2000; Rothbart, Ellis, & Posner, 
2011). We also included a dietary restraint measure in one study, using the Restrained Eating 
Scale (Herman & Polivy, 1980). The results of these interpersonal differences are not the core 
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focus of our meta-analysis, and the key effects of individual differences in response inhibition 
are summarized in the Supplemental Online Materials.  
Overview and Meta-Analytic Approach 
We followed Cumming’s recommendations in our meta-analytic approach (Cumming, 
2012, 2014) and used Borenstein’s Cumulative Meta-Analysis program for analyses 
(Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2009; www.meta-analysis.com). We computed 
the effect size and its 95% confidence interval for both the inhibitory spillover (number of 
studies k = 18) and the depletion effect (k = 9) in the individual studies by taking the mean 
differences and dividing them by the pooled standardized difference (Cohen’s d). The 
difference scores were determined by subtracting the impulse control score in the matched 
control condition from the impulse control score in the inhibitory control condition. Hence, a 
positive effect size indicates an increase in impulse control as a consequence of exerting self-
control in an unrelated domain relative to the control condition (i.e., an inhibitory spillover 
effect). A negative effect size indicates lower impulse control as a consequence of exerting 
self-control in an unrelated domain. In other words, a negative effect size confirms the 
presence of an ego-depletion effect. Because we used a wide variety of both IVs and DVs 
(the studies were conceptual rather than exact replications) and aim to generalize our results 
to self-control studies in general, a random effects model is most suitable (Borenstein et al., 
2009; Valentine, 2012).  
We report the Z-value testing the null hypothesis that the mean effect µ = 0 
(Rosenthal, 1979). In addition, the random effects model allows us to test the homogeneity of 
the effect sizes across studies, by means of the Q, I
2
 and T
2
 statistics. The Q statistic measures 
the total variability of the effect sizes between studies, weighted by the precision with which 
each effect size is measured. The Q statistic can be compared against a χ2-distribution (with 
df = k – 1) to test whether there is significant heterogeneity in the effect sizes between 
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studies. As the Q statistic is a relatively conservative test and can lead to Type II errors 
(accepting a set of studies as homogeneous while they have substantial heterogeneity), we 
increase the power of this test by raising its alpha level to .10 instead of .05 (Cumming, 
2014). The I
2
 and T
2
 statistics are derived from Q. I
2
 describes the degree of variability in 
effect sizes across studies, correcting for the number of studies included (contrary to the Q 
statistic). Hence the I
2 
statistic can be compared between meta-analyses. An I
2 
statistic of 25% 
suggests low levels of heterogeneity, 50% suggests moderate degrees of heterogeneity, and 
75% indicates high levels of heterogeneity (Cumming, 2014; Higgins, Thompson, Deeks, & 
Altman, 2003). Finally, the T
2
 statistic is an estimate of 2, which is the variance of the true 
effect size. 
In addition to providing insights on the size of the inhibitory spillover effect and the 
ego depletion effect in our complete dataset, we explored whether the effects are moderated 
by study-specific characteristics. We first examined whether the size of the inhibitory 
spillover and depletion effect differs depending on whether the dependent measure is a 
measure of behavioral intentions or of actual behavior. To this end we coded our DVs as 
either a measure of behavior (consumption of various unhealthy foods such as Pringles or 
M&M’s and Stroop task performance, k = 6) or as a measure of behavioral intentions 
(various self-control scenarios, intertemporal choices, and consumption intentions, k = 12) 
and analyzed whether this explains effect size heterogeneity across studies.  
Second, we explored the different categories of self-control manipulations to see 
whether there are substantial differences in the size of the inhibitory spillover effect as a 
function of conceptually different manipulations of self-control (e.g., attention control, 
emotion control, cognitive impulse control, thought control and consumption control; due to 
the smaller number of studies we could not conduct this analysis for the depletion effect). 
Finally, we conducted a meta-regression to explicitly test the moderating role of task timing.   
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We performed these tests on our complete data-set, irrespective of the results obtained 
in the individual studies, without outlier removal or consideration of covariates. Hence it is to 
be expected that our effect size estimates will be smaller than those computed solely based on 
published studies (e.g., d = 0.62 for the depletion effect according to Hagger et al., 2010). 
Effect sizes based on published studies are inflated to the extent that the probability that an 
experiment is included in a meta-analysis is influenced by the results of that particular 
experiment (Carter & McCullough, 2013, 2014). Conversely, our approach presents a 
conservative, bias-free effect size estimate of both the inhibitory spillover and the ego-
depletion effect, and in so doing heeds recent calls to provide more conclusive insights in the 
existence and strength of the ego-depletion effect (Hagger & Chatzisarantis, 2014). To 
provide evidence for the inclusion of all studies and data, we also discuss various indices for 
the detection of publication bias, notably the incredibility index of our results (IC-index, 
Ioannidis & Trikalinos, 2007; Schimmack, 2012), Begg and Mazumdar’s Rank Correlation 
Test (Begg & Mazumdar, 1994), and Egger’s test of the intercept (Egger, Smith, Schneider & 
Minder, 1997).  
Results 
The Inhibitory Spillover Effect 
 The averaged corrected standardized mean difference for the impact of exerting self-
control in one domain on simultaneous self-control performance in an unrelated domain is d 
= 0.22, 95% CI [0.107, 0.334], Z = 3.81, p < .001. See Figure 1 for a Forest Plot of the effect 
sizes and confidence intervals of the individual studies and overall estimate. Post-hoc power 
computations show that the meta-analysis achieved a power of .97 to detect an effect of this 
size. This result confirms the presence of an inhibitory spillover effect, indicating that 
exerting self-control in one domain reliably increases self-control performance in unrelated 
domains. In addition, the Q statistic fails to reach the significance threshold of p < .10, Q(17) 
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= 17.73, p = .41 and the I
2
 statistic is very low (4.1%). This indicates that the effect size 
estimates are homogeneous and that the large majority of the differences observed between 
individual studies are due to random sampling error, while only a very small proportion of the 
dispersion (4.1%) is due to real differences in effect sizes. This is further confirmed by T
2
 = 
0.002, which shows that the variance of the true effect size is very small. In other words, even 
though we used a wide variety of IVs and DVs, the experiments provide a homogeneous test 
of the inhibitory spillover effect. We also ran a jack-knifing procedure to examine whether 
any particular study had a relatively large impact by systematically removing one study at a 
time from the effect size estimation. The effect size ranged from d = 0.20, 95% CI [0.088, 
0.319] when Study 9 was removed to d = 0.26, 95% CI [0.143, 0.375] when Study 7 was 
removed. 
 Next, we examined whether the inhibitory spillover effect is moderated by study-
specific differences. We first investigated whether the inhibitory spillover effect differs in 
size depending on whether we measure behavior or behavioral intentions. The average effect 
size of the six studies using a behavioral measure of self-control is d = 0.20, 95% CI [-0.054, 
0.456] and the effect size of the 12 studies measuring behavioral intentions is d = 0.24, 95% 
CI [0.109, 0.376]. Importantly, the Q statistic testing the between group variance is Q(1) = 
0.08, p = .78. Hence there is no evidence that these two effect sizes differ in a systematic 
manner. We also checked whether there were systematic differences between online and lab 
studies, which is not the case, Q(1) = 1.32, p = .25. 
 Furthermore, we investigated whether the inhibitory spillover effect differs 
systematically in strength depending on the type of self-control (attention, emotion, thought, 
impulse or consumption control) exerted in the primary task. This analysis revealed 
considerable heterogeneity between these five different categories, as the between group 
variance is Q(4) = 11.13, p = .025 (see Figure 2 for a Forest Plot of the effect sizes and their 
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confidence interval per category of self-control manipulation). Further investigation suggests 
that the studies in which cognitive impulse control was manipulated differ from the other four 
categories of manipulations, as evidenced by a (non-significant) negative instead of positive 
effect, d = -0.26, 95% CI [-0.578, 0.065], Z = -1.56, p = .12. The standardized residuals of the 
relative weight of both of these studies (-2.15 and -2.16) are larger than |1.96| which suggests 
that these studies can be considered outliers (Borenstein, 2015). Re-running the analysis with 
the four other categories of self-control manipulations while excluding the two cognitive 
impulse control studies reveals no systematic differences in the effect size estimates of the 
inhibitory spillover effect between the studies that employed an attention control, emotion 
control, consumption control or thought control manipulation, Q(3) = 1.59, p = .66. The 
overall effect size estimate of these 16 remaining studies is d = 0.28, 95% CI [0.166, 0.402], 
Z = 4.71, p < .001. In sum, controlling thoughts, emotions, attention or unhealthy food 
consumption all facilitate simultaneous self-control ability in unrelated domains, in line with 
the inhibitory spillover hypothesis. Conversely, our manipulations of cognitive impulse 
control failed to improve self-control in unrelated domains, and self-control performance 
even slightly deteriorated when employing these paradigms. Potential conceptual differences 
between the cognitive impulse control studies and the other studies are reviewed in the 
General Discussion.  
The Ego Depletion Effect 
As a next step, we examined the presence of an ego depletion effect under sequential 
task timing. The averaged corrected standardized mean difference for the impact of exerting 
self-control in one domain on sequential self-control performance in an unrelated domain is d 
= -0.17, 95% CI [-0.356, 0.011], Z = 1.84, p = .066, confirming the presence of a marginally 
significant depletion effect (see Figure 3 for a Forest Plot of the study-specific as well as the 
overall effect size estimate). Contrary to earlier observations (Hagger et al., 2010), the ego 
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depletion study effect sizes were homogeneous, Q(8) = 9.85, p = .28, I
2
 = 18.78, T
2
 = 0.015. 
Hence, similar to the inhibitory spillover effect, the major differences in the ego-depletion 
effect sizes between studies are the consequence of random sampling error, while only 18.8% 
of the dispersion is due to real differences in effect sizes, which is considered a ‘small’ 
proportion (Cumming, 2014). Post-hoc power computations show that the power of the meta-
analysis to detect an effect of this size in this subset of studies is .53. However, it should be 
noted that there is some inherent circularity in a posteriori power computations as they are 
strongly dependent on the observed effect size. To illustrate, running a jack-knifing procedure 
on the studies employing the sequential task paradigm shows that the ego depletion effect 
size estimate ranges from d = -0.12, 95% CI [-0.317, 0.071] if Study 18 is removed from the 
dataset to d = -0.24, 95% CI [-0.409, -0.062] if Study 13 is removed. The corresponding 
power estimates vary tremendously, from .26 (based on n = 473 to detect d = -0.12) to .78 
(based on n = 519 to detect d = -0.24). Conversely, an a priori power calculation would have 
indicated that our meta-analysis was 100% powered to detect an ego depletion effect of the 
size reported in the literature (d = |.62|, Hagger et al., 2010) 
There were no systematic differences between online and lab studies, Q(1) = 0, p > 
.99, nor between whether the variable of interest was a measure of behavior or of behavioral 
intentions, Q(1) = 0.53, p = .47. 
The Moderating Role of Task Timing 
 To examine whether task timing (simultaneous vs. sequential) constitutes the crucial 
moderator between the inhibitory spillover and ego depletion effect, we conducted a random 
effects (method of moments) meta-regression with task timing as a contrast coded predictor. 
This analysis reveals that the effect size estimate of self-control performance under task 
simultaneity differs significantly from the estimate obtained under sequential task timing, B = 
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0.20, 95% CI [0.09, 0.30], Z = 3.73, p < .001, Q(1) = 13.90, p < .001.
4
 Hence task timing 
constitutes a crucial moderator between the inhibitory spillover and ego-depletion effect.  
Publication Bias  
 We aim to provide an estimate of the inhibitory spillover and ego-depletion effect 
sizes based on all the data obtained within the scope of this research project, without outlier 
removal, addition of covariates or any other data handling. In order to confirm the inclusion 
of all data collected, we discuss a number of publication bias indices. First, we examined the 
Incredibility Index (IC index; Ioannidis & Trikalinos, 2007; Schimmack, 2012). We 
computed the expected number of significant findings (p ≤ .05; k = 3.62) based on the total 
power of all individual studies (computed based on the weighted average effect sizes of the 
inhibitory spillover and ego depletion effect) and compared that with the actual observed 
number of significant findings (based on p ≤ .05, we identified four individual effect size 
estimates that can be considered significant) using a binomial distribution (Stat Trek, 2014). 
This probability is 50%, corresponding to an IC index of .50. This IC index is not close to the 
> .90 criterion that has been suggested as criterion to infer that there might exist more non-
significant findings than have been reported (Ioannidis & Trikalinos, 2007; Schimmack, 
2012).  
As Schimmack (2012) warns that a low IC score is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition to ensure credibility, we also looked at two other indices of publication bias. 
Specifically, we computed Begg and Mazumdar’s Rank Correlation Test (Begg & 
Mazumdar, 1994), which reflects the extent to which there is a relation between the 
standardized effect size (d) and its standard error (which is determined by sample size). The 
intuition is that effect sizes of studies with smaller samples have to be inflated more in order 
to reach significance, which leads to a negative correlation between the effect size and its 
standard error in cases of publication bias. To maximize the power of this test, we computed 
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this correlation based on all 27 effect size estimates. As we expect a negative effect size for 
the sequential self-control tasks but a positive effect size for the simultaneous self-control 
tasks, we first recoded the effect sizes of the individual studies such that a hypothesis-
consistent effect size received a positive sign and a hypothesis-inconsistent effect size 
received a negative sign (irrespective of the nature of the hypothesis). The correlation 
between the effect size estimates and their standard errors is not significant, Kendall’s tau b = 
-0.009, p = .47 (one-tailed, as recommended).  
To further confirm the absence of a systematic relationship between sample size and 
effect size, we also conducted Egger’s test of the intercept (Egger et al., 1997). This test is a 
regression equation where the standardized effect (effect size divided by its standard error) is 
predicted with the precision (the inverse of the standard error). The key variable of interest is 
the intercept which is an indication of publication bias if it differs from zero. We conducted 
this analysis over the complete set of effect sizes, recoded as outlined above. This analysis 
confirms that the intercept of this regression model is not significant, B0 = -0.24, t(25) = 0.18, 
p = .43 (one-tailed). In sum, a variety of different tests pertinent to the identification of 
publication bias consistently show that there are no statistical indications that the reported 
dataset is a subset of a larger dataset. 
General Discussion 
For many years, self-control has been a core research topic in various subfields of 
psychology and related disciplines. Academic research has so far mainly focused on 
understanding self-control dynamics in sequential task settings, and the finding that exerting 
self-control at time 1 has a negative impact on self-control ability at time 2 has set the 
research agenda for over a decade. Yet everyday self-control challenges are often not faced in 
isolation. At work we must control the lure of entertaining websites, chats with colleagues 
and the candy jar all at the same time in order to be productive. In social settings we aim to 
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stay focused on our interaction partner without being distracted by others or overindulging on 
tempting unhealthy food. Since existing self-control theories and empirical evidence are not 
unequivocal about whether and how simultaneously encountered self-control challenges may 
influence each other, our research seeks to fill this gap.  
Based on recent advances in self-control theories combined with new neurological 
insights in the origins and nature of response inhibition, we argued that exerting self-control 
in one domain may simultaneously facilitate self-control performance in unrelated domains. 
In other words, we expected the ego-depletion effect to reverse under simultaneous task 
conditions. To provide evidence for our hypothesis, we deemed it appropriate to stay close to 
the general research tradition from the ego-depletion literature and test the effect in different 
settings and with different paradigms. We therefore adopted a multi-study approach and 
examined the consequences of exerting effortful, intentional self-control in one domain on 
simultaneous self-control ability in unrelated domains in 18 different studies utilizing a wide 
variety of well-known paradigms from the self-control literature.  
However, we took a different approach in our data-analysis step and aimed to provide 
a conservative, data-selection bias free picture of the size and strength of the consequences of 
simultaneous (and sequential) self-control exertion. Following recent recommendations, we 
conducted an internal meta-analysis of all the data collected for this project (Braver et al., 
2014; Cumming, 2014; Maner, 2014; Schimmack, 2012; Stanley & Spence, 2014). This 
greatly improves the power of the test of the inhibitory spillover effect and provides insights 
in the consistency of the results obtained across studies. It has been argued that such a meta-
analytic approach is more tolerant to imperfections in the individual studies, but at the same 
time less susceptible to both Type I and Type II errors. It provides a much more accurate, 
clear and replicable portrait of empirical findings (Maner, 2014). We think that the current 
research provides a clear example of this point. If one looks only at the individual studies, 
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without removal of any outliers or consideration of (relevant) covariates (e.g., hunger in 
studies where unhealthy food consumption was our crucial DV) and evaluates the results 
based on null hypothesis significance testing, the picture is not very clear (see the results of 
the individual studies in Figure 1). However, as Figure 1 reveals, almost all of the individual 
studies provide directional support for our hypothesis. By pooling the data collected for all 
individual studies, we were able to increase the power of the test to examine the inhibitory 
spillover effect from an average of 0.15 for the individual studies to 0.97 for the meta-
analysis, and provide a reliable estimate of the effect size of the inhibitory spillover effect. 
The effect size is d = 0.22 with a 95% confidence interval of [0.107, 0.334], an estimate that 
is homogenous across a wide variety of conceptually different IVs (e.g., thought, attention, 
emotion, and consumption control) and DVs (e.g., impulsive decision making and unhealthy 
food consumption). The only manipulation of self-control that induced considerable 
heterogeneity in our overall effect size estimate was cognitive impulse control. We discuss 
the conceptual differences between these various categories of self-control in the section on 
executive functioning below.  
Importantly, the confidence interval of the inhibitory spillover effect does not include 
zero, and we therefore conclude that exerting self-control in one domain results in a general 
improvement in simultaneous self-control performance in a wide variety of unrelated 
domains. In addition to examining the consequences of simultaneous self-control, we aimed 
to provide empirical evidence for the crucial role of task timing (simultaneous vs. sequential) 
in a subset of nine studies. Our results confirm that the inhibitory spillover effect is bound to 
simultaneous self-control tasks, while they suggest the presence of an ego-depletion effect 
under sequential task settings. Remarkably, while the ego-depletion effect is one of the most 
frequently documented observations in the self-control literature, the confidence interval of 
our effect size estimate (at d = |0.17|, based on n = 580) just included zero (95% CI [-0.356, 
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0.011])  and is substantially lower than effect size estimates that appeared elsewhere (e.g., d = 
0.62 as estimated based on the published literature; Hagger et al., 2010). It should be noted 
that our estimates are on the conservative side – we reported all our data without the removal 
of any outliers or addition of covariates. For the sake of interpretation, note that the effect 
size of the average difference in height between 15- and 16-year old girls is also around 0.20 
(J. Cohen, 1977; a d = 0.50 would correspond to the height difference between 14- and 18-
year old girls). Bakker et al. (2012) recently concluded that an average effect size of 0.37 
across 13 meta-analyses in the psychological literature is still an overestimation, as 50% of 
these meta-analyses showed signs of publication bias. As such, it might be the case that our 
notion of what effect sizes to expect in psychological research is distorted as a consequence 
of publication bias. Carter and McCullough (2013, 2014) recently estimated the ego-
depletion effect at a maximum around d = 0.25, which is at par with our findings. As such, 
our results confirm their suggestion that the ego depletion effect is substantially smaller than 
the published literature implies. 
Implications for Theories on Self-Control and Response Inhibition 
The current findings have important implications for research in the domains of self-
control and response inhibition. Combining insights from neuropsychology and behavioral 
research in psychology, our research derives new predictions in a domain that is highly 
relevant for human functioning. Recent neuropsychological insights in the origins of response 
inhibition suggest that there is one neurological region – the inhibitory network – responsible 
for the inhibition of a wide variety of responses (J. R. Cohen & Lieberman, 2010). Notably, it 
has been suggested that recruiting this inhibitory network for the inhibition of one response 
could unintentionally facilitate response inhibition in unrelated domains – a phenomenon 
termed inhibitory spillover. So far, support for the inhibitory spillover hypothesis has been 
limited to the neurological level or obtained in the context of a highly learned, largely 
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automatized physiological form of response inhibition – bladder control (Berkman et al., 
2009; Tuk et al., 2011). While response inhibition lies at the heart of self-control exertion, 
whether or not the inhibitory spillover hypothesis has implications for the extensive literature 
on self-control in the behavioral domain had, perhaps surprisingly, not been investigated so 
far.  
One reason for this lack of research attention might be that, based on the most 
prevalent model of self-control – the limited resource model – one could easily reach the 
opposite prediction: Exerting effortful self-control in one domain depletes the limited 
resource, leaving less available for other acts of effortful self-control. Without additional 
assumptions, the limited resource model does not make different predictions for simultaneous 
versus sequential acts of self-control (Kaplan & Berman, 2010; Muraven & Baumeister, 
2000). As a result, theoretical reasons for expecting different outcomes for simultaneous as 
opposed to sequential acts of self-control have long been absent, which may also explain why 
there is such a dearth of research studying simultaneous self-control exertion.  
Contrary to the predictions by the limited resource model, our studies consistently 
show that exerting self-control in one domain simultaneously improves self-control 
performance in unrelated domains. In addition, our findings show that the ego-depletion 
effect is bound to self-control tasks that are encountered in sequence. The fact that self-
control improves when multiple acts of self-control are exerted simultaneously is not readily 
reconcilable with the notion of self-control as a limited resource.  
Our findings complement the recently proposed process model of self-control 
depletion. Specifically, Inzlicht and colleagues (2012, 2014) argue that the ego depletion 
effect is the consequence of a shift in motivation and attention from ‘have-to’ tasks requiring 
self-control at time 1 to ‘want to’ tasks – tasks that are enjoyable and intrinsically rewarding 
– at time 2. The original goal of the process model was to provide a more mechanistic 
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account of the ego-depletion effect in sequential settings. Conversely, the current research 
focused on what happens while people engage in a ‘have-to’ task, reasoning that successful 
performance on such ‘have-to’ tasks requires people to inhibit not just one but many different 
potentially interfering impulses at the same time. We argued that people may be equipped 
with this ability because the inhibition of responses is centrally organized. Consistent with 
this, we found that when people engage in a self-control requiring task, their self-control in 
other domains simultaneously increases.  
However, this also brings us to an important limitation of the current work. While our 
research provides evidence for the breadth of the self-control facilitation effect under task 
simultaneity by showing its occurrence across a wide variety of IVs and DVs, the depth of 
our evidence for inhibitory spillover as the underlying process is limited and further research 
is called for. This research could investigate the circumstances and stimuli most strongly 
associated with the self-control facilitation effect and identify its boundary conditions. In 
addition, future research should shed more light on the role played by individual differences. 
While we investigated a number of inhibition-related individual differences, due to power 
limitations in those individual studies our findings did not sketch a clear picture in this 
regard. 
In sum, the current findings suggest that a more complete understanding of self-
control dynamics requires us to look beyond the ego-depletion effect found in sequential task 
settings. Gaining more insight on simultaneous self-control processes sheds new light on self-
control dynamics and provides new input for self-control theories. The self-control 
facilitation effect found under simultaneous task conditions is difficult to explain from the 
limited resource perspective. In addition, the process model of ego depletion could evolve 
further by broadening its focus. Rather than primarily explaining changes that take place 
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when switching from ‘have-to’ to ‘want-to’ tasks, it could also deepen our understanding of 
what determines self-control ability during ‘have-to’ tasks.  
Implications for Executive Functioning  
While we believe that our research is the first to examine the consequences of 
effortful self-control in multiple domains simultaneously, previous research has investigated 
the impact of multi-tasking on self-control. For example, Ward and Mann (2000) looked at 
the consequences of cognitive load on the consumption of high-calorie food and found that 
restrained eaters were more likely to overindulge when they were simultaneously memorizing 
a series of art slides. Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999) found similar effects. In addition, Hinson, 
Jameson and Whitney (2003) showed that memorizing a difficult number increases people’s 
impulsive decisions in the financial domain. Given that it has repeatedly been shown that 
inducing cognitive load has negative consequences for simultaneous self-control, how can the 
findings reported here be reconciled with this recurring observation? We believe the answer 
might be found in the kind of executive functioning required by these dual tasks.  
It has been argued that executive functions lie at the heart of effective self-control 
exertion (Baumeister et al., 1998; Diamond, 2013; Hofmann et al., 2012; Schmeichel, 2007). 
There is general agreement on the existence of three components of executive functioning, 
namely (1) working memory capacity, (2) inhibition of prepotent responses, and (3) mental 
set shifting (Diamond, 2013; Hofmann et al., 2012; Miyake et al., 2000). These three 
components all contribute to self-control exertion in different ways, which may explain the 
difference between our findings and previous work in the domain of multitasking and self-
control. Previous work mainly taxed the working memory component by giving people a 
string of digits or art slides to keep in mind. Working memory capacity plays an important 
role in self-control by allowing individuals to keep their long-term goals salient in mind and 
to monitor their current actions vis-à-vis these long term goals. Without the active 
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representation of long-term goals, self-control is directionless and bound to fail (Hofmann et 
al., 2012). Consequently, taxing working memory reduces people’s ability to keep their self-
control goals in mind and as a result self-control performance will deteriorate. 
In the current research, we aimed to focus on the inhibitory component of executive 
functioning. While we cannot rule out the possibility that the dual task structure in the 
simultaneous self-control conditions imposed some cognitive load on our participants, it 
seems unlikely that the manipulations taxed working memory to the same extent as 
memorizing a series of digits or art slides. We purposely tried to select tasks that primarily 
require response inhibition rather than taxing working memory. For example, attention 
control requires the inhibition of the impulse to attend to distracting stimuli (Rueda et al., 
2011); emotion control requires the inhibition of natural emotions (Muraven & Baumeister, 
2000); and consumption control requires the inhibition of a consumption impulse (Dewitte et 
al., 2009; Hofmann, Friese, & Roefs, 2009). In line with the notion of inhibitory spillover, we 
found that engaging in one task that requires response inhibition simultaneously facilitated 
response inhibition in unrelated tasks.  
We believe that this research, together with previous work, shows that taxing the 
different components of executive functioning can have radically different consequences for 
self-control performance. Taxing working memory reduces people’s ability to keep their 
long-term goals in mind and has detrimental consequences for self-control ability (Hinson et 
al., 2003; Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999; Ward & Mann, 2000). Conversely, taxing the response 
inhibition component of executive functioning increases response inhibition in unrelated 
domains, which has a positive effect on self-control ability. Though speculative, this 
distinction might also provide a conceptual explanation for why we found an (insignificant) 
decrease in simultaneous self-control in the two studies in which we manipulated cognitive 
impulse control. It is possible that these two tasks (scratching certain “e’s” while avoiding 
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other “e’s” according to a pre-specified rule or writing an essay while avoiding the most 
common letters from one’s mother tongue) required relatively more working memory 
capacity as compared to the other self-control paradigms utilized.  
While it has been suggested that executive functions cannot be deployed for various 
tasks simultaneously (Kurzban, Duckworth, Kable, & Myers, 2013), our research suggests 
that this might critically depend on the nature of the executive functioning component 
required for task performance. More research on the consequences of taxing different 
components of executive functioning is called for as the picture is arguably more complex. 
For example, the consequences of taxing working memory for impulsive behavior are not 
unequivocal, as recent research suggests that taxing working memory can also reduce reward 
sensitivity and the processing of appetitive stimuli (Van Dillen, Papies & Hofmann, 2013; 
Van der Wal & Van Dillen, 2013). In addition, future research should deepen our 
understanding of the third component of executive functioning – mental set switching. Recent 
research has indicated that this component also plays a crucial role in self-control and can 
determine whether self-control facilitation or depletion effects are observed in sequential task 
settings (Dang et al., 2013; Dewitte et al., 2009). In general, future research should shed more 
light on the precise role of the different components of executive functioning in simultaneous 
compared to sequential self-control tasks.  
Conclusion 
While the importance of self-control ability for everyday human functioning is widely 
acknowledged across different streams of literature, it has frequently been noted that there is 
an important ‘but’ to human self-control ability: its limited nature. The current findings 
provide a brighter outlook on self-control ability and show that exerting self-control in one 
domain can actually facilitate simultaneous self-control ability in unrelated domains. Therein 
our research not only provides a new perspective on the dynamics of self-control exertion and 
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self-control theories, it also suggests that humans are more capable of dealing with the 
multitude of self-control challenges in contemporary society than has hitherto been assumed.  
 
  
THE PROPAGATION OF SELF-CONTROL                                        41 
 
Footnotes 
 
1
 All power estimates are obtained with the free software “G*Power 3.1.7”, downloaded from 
http://www.gpower.hhu.de/ (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). 
 
2
 While increasing sample size is an effective way of reducing the likelihood of observing an 
effect based on chance, it is exactly the previously mentioned uncertainty with regard to the 
“realness” and size of an effect that makes it problematic to determine how large a sample 
size should be in order to be “sufficiently” large. For example, in several of our studies we 
aim to detect an ego depletion effect, which according to the meta-analysis by Hagger et al. 
(2010) has an effect size of d = .62, obtained with an average of 27 participants per cell. 
Based on these numbers, the probability (power) to detect such an effect with a two-tailed test 
equals 61%. If, however, the true size of the ego depletion effect is closer to d = .20 as 
suggested by Carter and McCullough (2013, 2014), a rather different picture emerges. An 
experiment with 27 participants per cell would in that case only have a power of 11%. In 
order to obtain a power of 61%, one should increase the sample size tenfold to 252 
participants per cell, and even to 394 participants per cell to achieve a power of 80% as 
recommended by Cohen (1977). This example illustrates (1) that even though increasing 
sample sizes improves the power of individual studies, without accurate estimates of effect 
sizes there is significant uncertainty with regard to how large the sample sizes should be in 
order to achieve a sufficiently powered study, and (2) that studying a potentially small effect 
in a multi-study context would require excessively large samples if one expects the (majority 
of the) individual studies to be significant. 
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3
 As this was a modification rather than a direct implementation of an existing paradigm, we 
included two manipulation checks when first using this paradigm. To make sure that the 
attention control instruction had the intended effect, we asked participants how hard they had 
tried not to look at the banner while reading the scenarios (1 = not at all; 7 = very much). We 
also asked whether they thought the presence of the banner had influenced their answers to 
the scenarios (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). Results confirmed that participants 
in the attention control present condition had tried harder to ignore the banner ads (M = 5.92, 
SD = 1.50) than participants in the attention control absent condition (M = 3.80, SD = 2.07), 
t(70) = 5.00, p < .001, d = 1.17. There was no difference in the extent to which participants 
thought the banner ads had influenced their responses to the scenarios, t(70) = 0.04, p = .97, 
d = 0.01, which was low in both conditions (Mcontrol present = 2.29, SD = 1.71 and Mcontrol absent = 
2.27, SD = 1.50). This suggests that the attention control manipulation did not have a 
conscious effect on participants’ responses to the self-control scenarios. 
 
4
 One assumption of the meta-regression is that each effect size estimate is independent. This 
assumption is violated in the five studies which employed a 3-cell design and the 
observations in the control condition are used in the estimates of both the inhibitory spillover 
and the ego depletion effect. The consequence of assuming independence while there is a 
correlation is that the standard error of the difference is too large and the confidence interval 
too wide, reducing the likelihood of rejecting the null hypothesis (Borenstein et al., 2009). 
The reported test can therefore be considered a conservative test of the moderating role of 
task timing.  
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1 
Forest plot and summary statistics for simultaneous self-control tasks (inhibitory spillover). 
Effect sizes and 95% confidence intervals for the individual studies (gray lines and boxes) 
and overall estimate (black diamond).  
 
Figure 2 
Forest plot and summary statistics (effect sizes and 95% confidence intervals) per category of 
self-control manipulation for the simultaneous self-control tasks.  
 
Figure 3 
Forest plot and summary statistics for sequential self-control tasks. Effect sizes and 95% 
confidence intervals for the individual studies (gray lines and boxes) and overall estimate 
(black diamond).  
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Study 1 TC CV 63 0.310 0.254 0.064 -0.187 0.808 1.223 0.221 
Study 2 TC CV 104 0.251 0.197 0.039 -0.135 0.637 1.276 0.202 
Study 3 TC CV 83 0.139 0.220 0.048 -0.292 0.570 0.634 0.526 
Study 4 AC UFC 54 0.534 0.277 0.077 -0.009 1.078 1.928 0.054 
Study 5 CC CIC 51 0.569 0.286 0.082 0.009 1.129 1.993 0.046 
Study 6 AC CV 72 0.414 0.238 0.057 -0.053 0.881 1.738 0.082 
Study 7 CIC UFC 113 -0.180 0.189 0.036 -0.549 0.190 -0.953 0.341 
Study 8 TC UFI 81 0.386 0.224 0.050 -0.054 0.826 1.721 0.085 
Study 9 AC CV 73 0.493 0.238 0.057 0.027 0.959 2.072 0.038 
Study 10 TC CV 69 0.041 0.241 0.058 -0.431 0.514 0.171 0.864 
Study 11 TC CV 74 0.039 0.233 0.054 -0.418 0.496 0.168 0.867 
Study 12 CIC CV 37 -0.498 0.334 0.112 -1.152 0.157 -1.490 0.136 
Study 13 TC CV 60 0.445 0.261 0.068 -0.067 0.958 1.704 0.088 
Study 14 TC CV 62 0.233 0.255 0.065 -0.266 0.733 0.915 0.360 
Study 15 EC UFC 56 0.365 0.269 0.073 -0.163 0.893 1.355 0.176 
Study 16 AC UFC 46 0.009 0.295 0.087 -0.569 0.587 0.029 0.977 
Study 17 AC UFC 76 0.135 0.230 0.053 -0.316 0.585 0.586 0.558 
Study 18 TC UFI 94 0.310 0.208 0.043 -0.097 0.717 1.492 0.136 
Overall    0.220 0.058 0.003 0.107 0.334 3.809 0.000 
  
Figure 1. 
Notes: The effect sizes in the forest plot are presented with masses reflecting the relative weight of that particular study in the meta-analysis (study weight is determined by the standard error 
of the observed mean difference). Positive effect sizes reflect an increase in self-control ability as a consequence of self-control exertion in an unrelated domain (inhibitory spillover); 
negative effect sizes reflect a decrease in self-control ability (ego depletion). nd reflects the combined sample size of the inhibitory control and matched control conditions. Independent 
variables: AC = Attention Control; CC = Consumption Control; EC = Emotion Control; CIC = Cognitive Impulse Control, TC = Thought Control. Dependent variables: CV = Choice and 
Volition; CIC = Cognitive Impulse Control; UFC = Unhealthy Food Consumption; UFI = Unhealthy Food Consumption Intentions  
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Figure 1. 
Note: Independent variables: AC = Attention Control; CC = Consumption Control; EC = Emotion Control; CIC = Cognitive Impulse Control, TC = Thought Control  
56 
 
Figure 3. 
 
Study 
 
IV 
 
DV 
 
nd 
 
Std diff in 
means (d) 
 
Standard 
error 
 
Variance 
 
Lower 
limit 
 
Upper 
limit 
 
Z-
Value 
 
p-
Value 
 
Std diff in means and 95% CI 
 
 
 
 
Study 10 
 
 
TC 
 
CV 
 
71 
 
-0.325 
 
0.239 
 
0.057 
 
-0.793 
 
0.143 
 
-1.360 
 
0.174 
Study 11 
 
TC CV 77 -0.249 0.229 0.052 -0.697 0.200 -1.086 0.278 
Study 12 
 
CIC CV 33 -0.684 0.360 0.129 -1.389 0.021 -1.901 0.057 
Study 13 
 
TC CV 61 0.306 0.258 0.066 -0.199 0.811 1.188 0.235 
Study 14 
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Figure 1. 
Notes: The effect sizes in the forest plot are presented with masses reflecting the relative weight of that particular study in the meta-analysis (study weight is determined by the standard error 
of the observed mean difference). Positive effect sizes reflect an increase in self-control ability as a consequence of self-control exertion in an unrelated domain (inhibitory spillover); 
negative effect sizes reflect a decrease in self-control ability (ego depletion). nd reflects the combined sample size of the inhibitory control and matched control conditions. Independent 
variables: AC = Attention Control; CC = Consumption Control; EC = Emotion Control; CIC = Cognitive Impulse Control, TC = Thought Control. Dependent variables: CV = Choice and 
Volition; CIC = Cognitive Impulse Control; UFC = Unhealthy Food Consumption; UFI = Unhealthy Food Consumption Intentions  
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Supplemental Online Material 
 
 Overview of Manipulations and Measures of the Individual Studies 
 
Study Details Inhibitory Control Manipulation Impulse Control Measure Effects 
Examined 
Moderators 
Study 1 
 
n = 63 
Online study 
US participants 
Thought  Control  
 
Avoid thinking of a white bear after just having 
seen a picture of a white bear during a 3 min. 
thought listing task and while indicating 
preferences on the intertemporal choices. 
 
(Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987)  
 
Choice and Volition – 8 Intertemporal Choices 
 
Which of the two options do you prefer at this moment? 
1. receiving $10 tomorrow vs. receiving $12 in 25 days from now 
2. receiving $67 tomorrow vs. receiving $85 in 70 days from now 
3. receiving $34 tomorrow vs. receiving $35 in 43 days from now 
4. receiving $48 tomorrow vs. receiving $55 in 45 days from now 
5. receiving $40 tomorrow vs. receiving $70 in 20 days from now 
6. receiving $16 tomorrow vs. receiving $30 in 35 days from now 
7. receiving $30 tomorrow vs. receiving $35 in 20 days from now 
8. receiving $15 tomorrow vs. receiving $35 in 10 days from now 
 
(Li, 2008; Tuk, Trampe, & Warlop, 2011) 
  
Inhibition BIS/ BAS 
Study 2  
 
n = 104 
Online study 
US participants 
Thought  Control   
 
Avoid thinking of a panda after just having seen 
a picture of a panda during a 3 min. thought 
listing task and while indicating preferences on 
the 3 short scenarios 
 
(Based on Wegner et al., 1987) 
 
Choice and Volition – 3 Short Self-Control Scenario’s 
 
1. You have planned a very nice trip with your friends this weekend. 
However, your parents are painting the house and could really use a 
helping hand. What would you do? (1- Definitely help my parents, 
7-Definitely go on the trip; reverse coded) 
 
2. You try to save a certain amount every month. However, you’ve just 
seen a great pair of shoes on sale. It’s really a great deal, but you 
wouldn’t be able to save your target amount if you bought them. 
What would you do? (1- Definitely buy the shoes, 7- Definitely save 
the money) 
 
Inhibition SP/ SR 
EC 
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3. You are hungry and looking for a snack. You know taking a piece of 
fruit would be good for you. However, putting a ready-to-eat snack 
in the microwave would be much more tasty and satisfying. What 
would you do? (1- Definitely take the fruit, 7-Definitely take the 
snack; reverse coded) 
 
Study 3  
 
n = 83 
Lab study 
French and 
Dutch 
participants 
Thought  Control   
 
Avoid thinking of a white bear after just having 
seen a picture of a white bear during a 3 min. 
thought listing task and while indicating a 
preference for the scenario 
 
(Wegner et al., 1987) 
Choice and Volition – Self-Control Scenario 
 
Pierre is reading his notes for his final exam. Pierre has been studying 
hard and has been over the material several times, but the final is known 
to be very difficult and the grade from this course is extremely important 
to Pierre. Pierre intends to major in this area and feels that his graduate 
school scholarship may be linked to doing well in this and other similar 
courses. Academic grades and doing well at college are very important to 
Pierre. Just then, his best buddy from high school, Jean, unexpectedly 
calls him on his cell phone. Jean lives in a different town far away and is 
visiting only for one night. Pierre has not met Jean in a long while and is 
unlikely to be meeting with him again anytime soon, because Jean is 
going away to college overseas. Pierre wants to catch up with his buddy, 
and Jean suggests coming over to Pierre's place for a few hours. Pierre 
knows that it will be fun to spend time catching up on old times. It’s 
already late in the evening, and Pierre wants to spend several more hours 
reading for his final. On the other hand, Jean and he go back a long way, 
and he really wants to spend the time with Jean. 
1. If you were Pierre, how likely would you be to continue studying for 
the final? (1-Not at all likely, 7-Very likely) 
2. If you were Pierre, what would you do? (1-Study for the final, 7-
Spend the evening with Jean; reverse coded) 
 
(Hung & Labroo, 2011; Labroo & Patrick, 2009) 
 
Inhibition BIS 
Study 4  
 
n = 54 
Lab study 
French 
participants 
Attention Control 
 
Avoid looking at the words on the screen for a 
6min video clip in which a woman is being 
interviewed by an off-camera interviewer  
 
(Gailliot et al., 2007; Gilbert, Krull, & Pelham, 
1988) 
Unhealthy Food Consumption  
 
A bowl with 20 Pringles chips was provided at the start of the video clip 
and removed at the end of the clip. Number of Pringles consumed served 
as our measure of impulse control. 
 
(Friese, Hofmann, & Wanke, 2008; Hofmann, Rauch, & Gawronski, 
2007; Inzlicht & Kang, 2010) 
Inhibition BIS/ BAS 
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Study 5 
 
n = 51 
Lab study 
French 
participants 
 
Consumption Control   
 
Inhibit the consumption of Pringles 
 
(Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 
1998; Vohs & Heatherton, 2000) 
Cognitive Impulse Control 
 
Stroop Task – 4 blocks consisting of 25 trials each. In block 2 and 4, 
participants were instructed to indicate the meaning of the word on each 
trial. In block 1 and 3, participants were instructed to indicate the print 
color of the word on each trial. Participants could indicate their response 
by clicking on one of four buttons that appeared just below the target 
word (the buttons had a size of 2 x 0.6 cm each, shown 0.4 cm apart 
from each other, two buttons were presented next to each other and the 
other two appeared below them). The four different colors were written 
in black on these buttons. Each of these blocks contained both congruent 
(when the color word matched its print color) and incongruent trials 
(when the color word did not match its print color), presented in random 
order. Accuracy on incompatible trials (mismatch between color word 
and print color) served as measure of impulse control. 
 
(Gailliot, et al., 2007; Gailliot, Schmeichel, & Baumeister, 2006; Job, 
Dweck, & Walton, 2010) 
 
Inhibition X 
Study 6  
 
n = 72 
Online study 
US participants 
Attention Control 
 
Avoid looking at the banner ads on top of the 
screen while reading and answering the self-
control scenarios 
 
(Based on Gailliot et al., 2007; Gilbert et al., 
1988; see footnote 2 in the manuscript for 
manipulation check results) 
Choice and Volition – 2 Short Self-Control Scenario’s 
 
1. You have planned a very nice trip with your friends this weekend. 
However, your parents are painting the house and could really use a 
helping hand. What would you do? (1- Definitely go on the trip, 7- 
Definitely help my parents) 
 
2. You try to save a certain amount every month. However, you’ve just 
seen that the gorgeous jacket you’ve wanted for ages is now on sale. 
It’s really a great deal, but you wouldn’t be able to save your target 
amount if you bought the jacket. What would you do? (1- Definitely 
buy the jacket, 7- Definitely save the money) 
 
Inhibition SP/ SR 
Study 7  
 
n = 113 
Lab study 
French 
participants 
Cognitive Impulse Control   
 
Avoid the use of "à" or "â" while writing an 
essay in French 
 
(Mark Muraven, Gagne, & Rosman, 2008; Mark 
Unhealthy Food Consumption  
 
A bowl filled with 20 Pringles chips was provided at the start of the 
essay task and removed at the end. Number of Pringles consumed served 
as our measure of impulse control. 
 
Inhibition BIS/ BAS 
SP/ SR 
EC 
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 Muraven, Shmueli, & Burkley, 2006) (Friese, et al., 2008; Hofmann, et al., 2007; Inzlicht & Kang, 2010) 
 
 
 
Study 8  
 
n = 81 
Online study 
US participants 
Thought  Control  
 
“Old Flames Paradigm”  
Avoid thinking of a significant past relationship 
during a thought listing task after just having 
answered 10 questions about this relationship 
partner. Continue not to think of this 
relationship partner while indicating 
consumption preferences. 
 
(Wegner & Gold, 1995) 
 
Food Consumption Intentions – Healthy and Unhealthy Food 
 
How many tomatoes/ grapes/ chips/ Skittles do you want to consume 
now? (1 = none, 5 = the entire bowl/pack). 
Pictures of each food item were provided.  
 
(Cornil & Chandon, 2013; Hedgcock, Vohs, & Rao, 2012)  
Inhibition BIS/BAS 
SP/ SR 
EC 
Restrained 
eating 
Study 9  
 
n = 73 
Online study 
US participants 
Attention Control 
 
Avoid looking at the banner ads on top of the 
screen while reading and answering the self-
control scenario 
 
 
(Based on Gailliot et al., 2007; Gilbert et al., 
1988) 
Choice and Volition – Self-Control Scenario 
 
It is Friday evening and Patrick/Patricia [matched to the gender of the 
participant] has been looking forward to this evening a lot. He/She hasn’t 
seen his/her friends for a while and has arranged to go to a concert with 
them. His/Her favorite band will play and he/she has bought the best 
tickets he/she could get a long time ago. It is a unique opportunity, as it 
is the first time his/her favorite band gives a concert in his city. He/She is 
really in the mood. Just then his/her mother calls him/her. His/Her 
parents are panicking a bit, because they just realized that today is the 
deadline to submit tax declarations, and they are completely lost in the 
complicated forms. Although a neighbor has offered his help, they feel 
uncomfortable about sharing such private information with the neighbor. 
His/Her mother asks whether Patrick/Patricia can come over tonight to 
help them with the taxes. Patrick/Patricia has a good relationship with 
his/her parents and know that they are always willing to help him. But 
he/she also realizes that it will take him/her the whole evening to help 
them.  
On the one hand, Patrick/Patricia has been really looking forward to this 
evening with his/her friends and to seeing the live performance of his/her 
favorite band. On the other hand, Patrick/Patricia values his relationship 
with his/her parents a lot, and knows how bad they will if they have to 
involve the neighbor. 
Inhibition SP/ SR 
EC 
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1. If you were Patrick/Patricia, what would you do? (1- Definitely go to 
the concert, 9- Definitely help the parents) 
2. If you were Patrick/Patricia, how likely would you be to go to the 
concert? (1- Very unlikely, 9- Very likely; reverse coded) 
3. If you were Patrick/Patricia, how likely would you be to go to your 
parents? (1- Very unlikely, 9- Very likely) 
 
(Scenario based on Hung & Labroo, 2011; Labroo & Patrick, 2009. A 
pretest confirmed that this scenario reflects a self-control dilemma. 
Further details are available on request from the first author.) 
  
Study 10  
 
n = 104 
Online study 
US participants 
Thought  Control   
 
Avoid thinking of a white bear after just having 
seen a picture of a white bear during a 3 minute 
thought listing task. Participants in the 
inhibition condition were instructed to continue 
not to think of a white bear while answering the 
scenario. For participants in the depletion 
condition the thought control task ended before 
answering the scenario. 
 
 (Wegner et al. 1987) 
 
Choice and Volition – Self-Control Scenario 
 
Mary is a 21-year-old college student with a part-time job. It is two days 
before Mary gets her next paycheck and she has only $25 left for 
necessities. In addition to food, Mary needs to buy a pair of warm socks 
for an outdoor party this weekend. After work, she goes with her friend 
Susan to the mall to purchase the socks. As they are walking through 
Macy's, Mary sees a great looking sweater on sale for $75.  
 
Which one of the following purchase decisions do you think Mary will 
make?  
1- she will buy the socks only 
2- she will want the sweater but not buy it 
3- she will decide not to buy the socks, and buy the sweater instead with 
a credit card 
4- she will buy both the socks and the sweater with a credit card 
5- she will buy both the socks and the sweater, plus matching pants and a 
shirt, also with a credit card 
 
(Rook & Fisher, 1995; Vohs & Faber, 2007) 
 
  
Inhibition 
Depletion 
 
BIS/BAS 
Study 11 
 
n = 111 
Online study 
US participants 
Thought  Control   
 
Avoid thinking of a white bear after just having 
seen a picture of a white bear during a 3 minute 
thought listing task. Participants in the 
inhibition condition were instructed to continue 
Choice and Volition – Self-Control Scenario 
 
Mary is a 21-year-old college student with a part-time job. It is two days 
before Mary gets her next paycheck and she has only $25 left for basic 
necessities. In addition to food, Mary needs to buy a pair of warm socks 
for an outdoor party this weekend. After work, she goes with her friend 
Inhibition 
Depletion 
BIS/BAS 
62 
 
not to think of a white bear while answering the 
scenario. For participants in the depletion 
condition the thought control task ended before 
answering the scenario. 
 
 (Wegner et al. 1987) 
 
Susan to the mall to purchase the socks. As they are walking through 
Macy's, Mary sees that a gorgeous sweater she’s wanted for ages is on 
sale. Instead of costing $120 it is now on sale for $75. 
 
Which one of the following purchase decisions do you think Mary will 
make?  
1- she will only buy the food 
2- she will buy food and the warm socks 
3- she will buy food and the warm socks, and crave the sweater but not 
buy it 
4- she will buy the food, but no socks, and will buy the sweater with a 
credit card 
5- she will buy both the food and the socks, and will buy the sweater 
with a credit card 
6- she will buy both the food and the socks, and the sweater, plus 
matching pants and a shirt, also with a credit card 
 
(Based on Rook & Fisher, 1995; Vohs & Faber, 2007) 
 
 
Study 12  
 
n = 52 
Lab study 
Dutch 
participants 
Cognitive Impulse Control   
 
Cross out all the “e’s” in two texts EXCEPT 
when it is adjacent to another vowel or one extra 
letter away from another vowel. 
For participants in the depletion condition, the 
crossing “e’s” task ended before the 
intertemporal choices. Participants in the 
inhibition condition were instructed to cross out 
letters while also indicating a preference. 
Participants in the matched control condition 
were instructed to cross out all the “e’s” without 
applying a rule. 
 
(Baumeister, et al., 1998; Muraven, 2008) 
 
 
 
 
Choice and Volition – 8 Intertemporal Choices 
 
Which of the two options do you prefer at this moment? 
 
1. receiving $10 tomorrow vs. receiving $12 in 25 days from now 
2. receiving $67 tomorrow vs. receiving $85 in 70 days from now 
3. receiving $34 tomorrow vs. receiving $35 in 43 days from now 
4. receiving $48 tomorrow vs. receiving $55 in 45 days from now 
5. receiving $40 tomorrow vs. receiving $70 in 20 days from now 
6. receiving $16 tomorrow vs. receiving $30 in 35 days from now 
7. receiving $30 tomorrow vs. receiving $35 in 20 days from now 
8. receiving $15 tomorrow vs. receiving $35 in 10 days from now 
 
(Li, 2008; Tuk, et al., 2011) 
 
Inhibition 
Depletion 
BIS 
EC 
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Study 13 
 
n = 91 
Online study 
US participants 
Thought  Control   
 
Avoid thinking of kittens after just having seen 
pictures of kittens during a 3 minute thought 
listing task. Participants in the inhibition 
condition were instructed to continue not to 
think of kittens while answering the scenario. 
For participants in the depletion condition the 
thought control task ended before answering the 
scenario. 
 
(Based on Wegner et al., 1987) 
 
 
 
Choice and Volition – Self-Control Scenario 
 
Jack is reading his notes for his final exam. Jack has been studying hard 
and has been over the material several times, but the final is known to be 
very difficult and the grade from this course is extremely important to 
Jack. Jack intends to major in this area and feels that his graduate school 
scholarship may be linked to doing well in this and other similar courses. 
Academic grades and doing well at college are very important to Jack. 
Just then, his best buddy from high school, John, unexpectedly calls him 
on his cell phone. John lives in a different town far away and is visiting 
only for one night. Jack has not met John in a long while and is unlikely 
to be meeting with him again anytime soon, because John is going away 
to college overseas. Jack wants to catch up with his buddy, and John 
suggests coming over to Jack's place for a few hours. Jack knows that it 
will be fun to spend time catching up on old times. It’s already late in the 
evening, and Jack wants to spend several more hours reading for his 
final. On the other hand, John and he go back a long way, and he really 
wants to spend the time with John. 
 
1. If you were Jack, how likely would you be to continue studying for the 
final? (1 - Very Unlikely, 9 - Very Likely) 
2. If you were Jack, how likely would you be to spend the evening with 
John?(1 - Very Unlikely, 9 - Very Likely; reverse coded) 
3. If you were Jack, what would you do? (1 - Study for the Final, 9 - 
Spend the Evening with John; reverse coded) 
 
(Hung & Labroo, 2011; Labroo & Patrick, 2009) 
  
Inhibition 
Depletion 
BIS/ BAS 
Study 14  
 
n = 89 
Online study 
US participants 
Thought  Control  
 
Avoid thinking of kittens after just having seen 
pictures of kittens during a 3 minute thought 
listing task. Participants in the inhibition 
condition were instructed to continue not to 
think of kittens while answering the scenario. 
For participants in the depletion condition the 
thought control task ended before answering the 
scenario. 
Choice and Volition – Self-Control Scenario 
 
Pat is on a diet to look attractive and keep healthy. Pat has an audition in 
two days and feels that the success of the audition may be linked to a 
successful diet. Also, her doctor has advised her that keeping on the diet 
is very important to her personal health. Just then, Pat’s best friend from 
high school, Kate, unexpected calls her on her cell phone and invites Pat 
to her home. When you get there, Kate has spent a few hours in the 
kitchen preparing a very tempting chocolate cake, Pat’s favorite. It’s 
already late in the evening, and Pat wants to stick to her dieting goal. On 
Inhibition 
Depletion 
BIS/ BAS 
SP/ SR 
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(Based on Wegner et al., 1987) 
 
the other hand, Kate and she go back a long way, and she does not want 
to disappoint Kate. 
1. If you were Pat, how likely would you be to eat the cake? (1 -very 
unlikely, 9 -very likely) 
2. If you were Pat, how likely would you be to stick to the dieting goal 
and resist the cake? (1 -very unlikely, 9 -very likely) 
3. If you were Pat, what would you do? (1 -stick to the dieting goal, 9 -
eat the cake) 
 
 
Study 15  
 
n = 109 
Lab study 
Dutch 
participants 
Emotion Control   
 
Inhibit any emotional reaction while watching a 
6 min video clip. 
 
(Friese, et al., 2008) 
Unhealthy Food Consumption  
 
A bowl with 20 Pringles chips was provided either the start of the first 
video clip and removed at the end of this clip (simultaneous conditions – 
aimed to test the inhibitory spillover effect), or at the start of a second 
video clip and removed at the end of this clip (sequential conditions – 
aimed to test the ego depletion effect). Number of Pringles left over 
served as our measure of impulse control. 
 
(Friese, et al., 2008; Hofmann, et al., 2007; Inzlicht & Kang, 2010) 
 
 
Inhibition 
Depletion 
BIS/BAS 
Study 16  
 
n = 87 
Lab study 
French 
participants 
Attention Control 
 
Avoid looking at the words on the screen for a 
6min video clip in which a woman is being 
interviewed by an off-camera interviewer  
 
(Gailliot, et al., 2007; Gilbert, et al., 1988) 
 
Unhealthy Food Consumption  
 
A bowl with 20 Pringles chips was either provided during the attention 
control task or immediately after the attention control task. Number of 
Pringles left over served as our measure of impulse control. 
 
(Friese, et al., 2008; Hofmann, et al., 2007; Inzlicht & Kang, 2010) 
 
 
Inhibition 
Depletion 
BIS/BAS 
Study 17  
 
n = 154 
Lab study 
French 
participants 
Attention Control 
 
Avoid looking at the words on the screen for a 
6min video clip in which a woman is being 
interviewed by an off-camera interviewer  
 
(Gailliot, et al., 2007; Gilbert, et al., 1988) 
 
Unhealthy Food Consumption  
 
A bowl with 180 grams of M&M’s was either provided during the 
attention control task or immediately after the attention control task. 
Amount of M&M’s left over served as our measure of impulse control. 
 
(Friese, et al., 2008; Hofmann, et al., 2007; Inzlicht & Kang, 2010) 
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Study 18 
 
n = 201 
Online study 
US participants 
Thought  Control  
 
“Old Flames Paradigm”  
Simultaneous conditions: Avoid thinking of a 
significant past relationship during a 2-minute 
thought listing task after just having answered 
10 questions about this relationship partner. 
Continue not to think of this relationship partner 
while indicating consumption preferences. 
Sequential conditions: Avoid thinking of a 
significant past relationship during a 4-minute 
thought listing task after just having answered 
10 questions about this relationship partner; free 
to think about anything when indicating 
consumption preferences afterwards 
Participants in the matched control conditions 
did not receive any thought suppression 
instructions. 
 
(Wegner & Gold, 1995) 
Food Consumption Intentions –Unhealthy Food 
 
Imagine you would go for a drink/snack/dinner right now. How likely 
are you to choose a soft drink/candy bar/hamburger? (1 = very unlikely, 
9 = very likely). Pictures of each food item were provided.  
 
(Cornil & Chandon, 2013; Hedgcock, et al., 2012)  
Inhibition 
Depletion 
BIS/BAS 
SP/SR 
EC 
 
 
Notes: In a subset of studies (k = 9), we included the PANAS (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) in order to check whether the self-control manipulation had inadvertently 
induced differences in mood, which was never the case (all p’s > .05). In studies where food consumption was our crucial variable of interest, we included two measures to 
control for individual differences in appetite. Specifically, we asked participants when they last ate before the experiment (1= just before the experiment, 7 = more than five 
hours before) and we asked them to indicate whether they last ate a full meal (breakfast, lunch, etc.) or a snack (cookie, candybar, etc.). Controlling for individual differences 
in appetite improves the power of the individual studies. We do not correct for individual differences in appetite in the meta-analysis.    
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Summary of Results – Individual Difference Measures 
 
Sensitivity of the Behavioral Inhibition System. We examined whether the 
inhibitory spillover effect was moderated by interpersonal differences in motivational 
inhibition as measured with the BIS scale (Carver & White, 1994). Given the substantial 
homogeneity in the effect sizes of the inhibitory spillover effect across our studies, we pooled 
the data of all the studies containing the BIS questionnaire (k = 14, n = 966 observations to 
test the inhibitory spillover effect). We specified a regression model with a contrast code for 
the self-control conditions (0.5 for the inhibitory control present condition; -0.5 for the 
matched control condition), the standardized BIS score and their interaction as predictors of 
the standardized impulse control scores. Results revealed a significant simple effect of self-
control condition, b* = 0.074, t(962) = 2.32, p = .02 (i.e., the inhibitory spillover effect). In 
addition, there is a negative effect of BIS on impulse control, b* = -0.10, t(962) = 3.11, p < 
.002, suggesting that people with a more sensitive BIS had on average lower levels of 
impulse control. Contrary to previous findings (Tuk et al., 2011), the interaction between 
self-control condition and BIS does not reach significance, b* = -0.017, t(962) = 0.55, p = 
.58.  
 Next, we examined whether the inhibitory spillover effect is moderated by BIS as 
measured with the Sensitivity to Punishment (SP) subscale of the SPSRQ (Torrubia et al., 
2001, k = 7, n = 599). A regression model with the contrast coded self-control condition, the 
standardized SP score and their interaction reveals similar effects to the ones reported above. 
Specifically, there is a significant simple effect of self-control condition on the standardized 
impulse control score, b* = 0.116, t(595) = 2.86, p < .01 (i.e., the inhibitory spillover effect), 
as well as a significant and negative simple effect of SP on impulse control, b* = -0.112, 
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t(595) = 2.77, p < .01. The interaction between self-control condition and SP fails to reach 
significance, b* = -0.03, t(595) = 0.82, p = .41. 
 Executive Inhibition. While BIS reflects a relatively automatic, bottom-up inhibitory 
process, executive inhibition has been proposed to reflect a top-down, effortful form of 
control which is directly related to the human ability to inhibit a dominant response in order 
to perform a subdominant response (Rothbart, Ahadi, & Evans, 2011). Hence, motivational 
inhibition and executive inhibition are conceptualized as rather different forms of control. In 
line with the notion that people with low motivational inhibition might compensate with 
higher executive inhibition (Rothbart, Ellis, & Posner, 2000), we found a negative correlation 
between executive inhibition (measured with the Effortful Control (EC) scale) and BIS (r = -
.20, p < .001, n = 447) as well as between EC and SP (r = -.46, p < .001, n = 572).  
We examined whether the inhibitory spillover effect is moderated by EC (k = 6, n = 
502). We specified a regression model with the contrast coded self-control condition, the 
standardized EC score and their interaction as predictors of the standardized impulse control 
score. Results reveal a marginally significant simple effect of self-control condition on the 
impulse control score, b* = 0.084, t(498) = 1.90, p = .057 (i.e., the inhibitory spillover effect). 
While the simple effect of EC was not significant, b* = 0.046, t(498) = 1.04, p = .30, the 
interaction between inhibitory condition and EC reached significance, b* = 0.088, t(498) = 
1.99, p = .047. To decompose this interaction, we used the Johnson-Neyman technique 
(Spiller, Fitzsimons, Lynch, & McClelland, 2013) to identify the range of Effortful Control 
scores for which the inhibitory spillover effect is significant. This analysis reveals that the 
inhibitory spillover effect passed the p < .05 criterion for 40% of our sample – those 
participants who scored 0.024 points or more above the mean EC score (MEC = 4.63, SDEC = 
0.79, Johnson-Neyman point = 4.65, p = 0.05, 95% CI= [0.00, 0.35]). 
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